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In mintplex-labs/anything-llm v1.5.11 desktop version for Windows, the application opens server port 3001 on 0.0.0.0 with no authentication by default. This vulnerability allows an attacker to gain full backend access, enabling them to perform actions such as deleting all data from the workspace.

A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm, affecting both the desktop application version 1.2.0 and the latest version of the web application. The vulnerability arises from the application's feature to fetch and embed content from websites into workspaces, which can be exploited to execute arbitrary JavaScript code. In the desktop application, this flaw can be escalated to Remote Code Execution (RCE) due to insecure application settings, specifically the enabling of 'nodeIntegration' and the disabling of 'contextIsolation' in Electron's webPreferences. The issue has been addressed in version 1.4.2 of the desktop application.

As a default user on a multi-user instance of AnythingLLM, you could execute a call to the `/export-data` endpoint of the system and then unzip and read that export that would enable you do exfiltrate data of the system at that save state. This would require the attacked to be granted explicit access to the system, but they can do this at any role. Additionally, post-download, the data is deleted so no evidence would exist that the exfiltration occured.

If an attacked was given access to an instance with the admin or manager role there is no backend authentication that would prevent the attacked from creating a new user with an `admin` role and then be able to use this new account to have elevated privileges on the instance

A user who is privileged already `manager` or `admin` can set their profile picture via the frontend API using a relative filepath to then user the PFP GET API to download any valid files. The attacker would have to have been granted privileged permissions to the system before executing this attack.

Enable exports of the database and associated exported information of the system via the default user role. The attacked would have to have been granted access to the system prior to the attack. It is worth noting that the deterministic nature of the export name is lower risk as the UI for exporting would start the download at the same time, which once downloaded - deletes the export from the system. The endpoint for exporting should simply be patched to a higher privilege level.

Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM. This would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced. There is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector.

Any user can delete an arbitrary folder (recursively) on a remote server due to bad input sanitization leading to path traversal. The attacker would need access to the server at some privilege level since this endpoint is protected and requires authorization.

As a manager, you should not be able to modify a series of settings. In the UI this is indeed hidden as a convenience for the role since most managers would not be savvy enough to modify these settings. They can use their token to still modify those settings though through a standard HTTP request While this is not a critical vulnerability, it does indeed need to be patched to enforce the expected permission level.

The inclusion of the web scraper for AnythingLLM means that any user with the proper authorization level (manager, admin, and when in single user) could put in the URL ``` http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance ``` which is a special IP and URL that resolves only when the request comes from within an EC2 instance. This would allow the user to see the connection/secret credentials for their specific instance and be able to manage it regardless of who deployed it. The user would have to have pre-existing knowledge of the hosting infra which the target instance is deployed on, but if sent - would resolve if on EC2 and the proper `iptable` or firewall rule is not configured for their setup.

Attacker, with permission to submit a link or submits a link via POST to be collected that is using the file:// protocol can then introspect host files and other relatively stored files.

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing users with 'default' role to delete documents uploaded by 'admin'. Despite the intended restriction that prevents 'default' role users from deleting admin-uploaded documents, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted DELETE request to the /api/system/remove-document endpoint. This vulnerability is due to improper access control checks, enabling unauthorized document deletion and potentially leading to loss of data integrity.

Theoretically, it would be possible for an attacker to brute-force the password for an instance in single-user password protection mode via a timing attack given the linear nature of the `!==` used for comparison. The risk is minified by the additional overhead of the request, which varies in a non-constant nature making the attack less reliable to execute

User can send a chat that contains an XSS opportunity that will then run when the chat is sent and on subsequent page loads. Given the minimum requirement for a user to send a chat is to be given access to a workspace via an admin the risk is low. Additionally, the location in which the XSS renders is only limited to the user who submits the XSS. Ultimately, this attack is limited to the user attacking themselves. There is no anonymous chat submission unless the user does not take the minimum steps required to protect their instance.

Authentication bypass in vector-admin allows a user to register to a vector-admin server while “domain restriction” is active, even when not owning an authorized email address.

AnythingLLM is an application that turns any document, resource, or piece of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In versions prior to commit `08d33cfd8` an unauthenticated API route (file export) can allow attacker to crash the server resulting in a denial of service attack. The “data-export” endpoint is used to export files using the filename parameter as user input. The endpoint takes the user input, filters it to avoid directory traversal attacks, fetches the file from the server, and afterwards deletes it. An attacker can trick the input filter mechanism to point to the current directory, and while attempting to delete it the server will crash as there is no error-handling wrapper around it. Moreover, the endpoint is public and does not require any form of authentication, resulting in an unauthenticated Denial of Service issue, which crashes the instance using a single HTTP packet. This issue has been addressed in commit `08d33cfd8`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Improper Input Validation in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.

Improper Access Control in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.

Relative Path Traversal in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.0.1.