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The Leagoo P1 device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.wtk.factory (versionCode=1, versionName=1.0) that contains an exported broadcast receiver named com.wtk.factory.MMITestReceiver allows any app co-located on the device to programmatically initiate a factory reset. In addition, the app initiating the factory reset does not require any permissions. A factory reset will remove all user data and apps from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that have not been backed up or synced externally. The capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves with the exception of enabled Mobile Device Management (MDM) apps), although this capability can be obtained by leveraging an unprotected app component of a pre-installed platform app.

The Leagoo P1 Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains the android framework (i.e., system_server) with a package name of android that has been modified by Leagoo or another entity in the supply chain. The system_server process in the core Android package has an exported broadcast receiver that allows any app co-located on the device to programmatically initiate the taking of a screenshot and have the resulting screenshot be written to external storage. The taking of a screenshot is not transparent to the user; the device has a screen animation as the screenshot is taken and there is a notification indicating that a screenshot occurred. If the attacking app also requests the EXPAND_STATUS_BAR permission, it can wake the device up using certain techniques and expand the status bar to take a screenshot of the user's notifications even if the device has an active screen lock. The notifications may contain sensitive data such as text messages used in two-factor authentication. The system_server process that provides this capability cannot be disabled, as it is part of the Android framework. The notification can be removed by a local Denial of Service (DoS) attack to reboot the device.

The Leagoo Z5C Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.android.settings (versionCode=23, versionName=6.0-android.20170630.092853) that contains an exported broadcast receiver that allows any app co-located on the device to programmatically initiate a factory reset. In addition, the app initiating the factory reset does not require any permissions. A factory reset will remove all user data and apps from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that have not been backed up or synced externally. The capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves with the exception of enabled Mobile Device Management (MDM) apps), although this capability can be obtained by leveraging an unprotected app component of a pre-installed platform app.

The Leagoo Z5C Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed app with a package name of com.android.messaging (versionCode=1000110, versionName=1.0.001, (android.20170630.092853-0)) containing an exported content provider named com.android.messaging.datamodel.MessagingContentProvider. Any app co-located on the device can read the most recent text message from each conversation. That is, for each phone number where the user has either sent or received a text message from, a zero-permission third-party app can obtain the body of the text message, phone number, name of the contact (if it exists), and a timestamp for the most recent text message of each conversation. As the querying of the vulnerable content provider app component can be performed silently in the background, a malicious app can continuously monitor the content provider to see if the current message in each conversation has changed to obtain new text messages.

The Leagoo P1 Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a hidden root privilege escalation capability to achieve command execution as the root user. They have made modifications that allow a user with physical access to the device to obtain a root shell via ADB by modifying read-only system properties at runtime. Specifically, modifying the ro.debuggable and the ro.secure system properties to a certain value and then restarting the ADB daemon allows for a root shell to be obtained via ADB.

The Leagoo Z5C Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed app with a package name of com.android.messaging (versionCode=1000110, versionName=1.0.001, (android.20170630.092853-0)) with an exported broadcast receiver app component named com.android.messaging.trackersender.TrackerSender. Any app co-located on the device, even one with no permissions, can send a broadcast intent with certain embedded data to the exported broadcast receiver application component that will result in the programmatic sending of a text message where the phone number and body of the text message is controlled by the attacker.

Android devices with code from Ragentek contain a privileged binary that performs over-the-air (OTA) update checks. Additionally, there are multiple techniques used to hide the execution of this binary. This behavior could be described as a rootkit. This binary, which resides as /system/bin/debugs, runs with root privileges and does not communicate over an encrypted channel. The binary has been shown to communicate with three hosts via HTTP: oyag[.]lhzbdvm[.]com oyag[.]prugskh[.]net oyag[.]prugskh[.]com Server responses to requests sent by the debugs binary include functionalities to execute arbitrary commands as root, install applications, or update configurations. Examples of a request sent by the client binary: POST /pagt/agent?data={"name":"c_regist","details":{...}} HTTP/1. 1 Host: 114.80.68.223 Connection: Close An example response from the server could be: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"code": "01", "name": "push_commands", "details": {"server_id": "1" , "title": "Test Command", "comments": "Test", "commands": "touch /tmp/test"}} This binary is reported to be present in the following devices: BLU Studio G BLU Studio G Plus BLU Studio 6.0 HD BLU Studio X BLU Studio X Plus BLU Studio C HD Infinix Hot X507 Infinix Hot 2 X510 Infinix Zero X506 Infinix Zero 2 X509 DOOGEE Voyager 2 DG310 LEAGOO Lead 5 LEAGOO Lead 6 LEAGOO Lead 3i LEAGOO Lead 2S LEAGOO Alfa 6 IKU Colorful K45i Beeline Pro 2 XOLO Cube 5.0