Search Vulnerabilities

A flaw was found in the Keylime registrar that could allow a bypass of the challenge-response protocol during agent registration. This issue may allow an attacker to impersonate an agent and hide the true status of a monitored machine if the fake agent is added to the verifier list by a legitimate user, resulting in a breach of the integrity of the registrar database.

A flaw was found in Keylime. Due to their blocking nature, the Keylime registrar is subject to a remote denial of service against its SSL connections. This flaw allows an attacker to exhaust all available connections.

A flaw was found in the keylime attestation verifier, which fails to flag a device's submitted TPM quote as faulty when the quote's signature does not validate for some reason. Instead, it will only emit an error in the log without flagging the device as untrusted.

A vulnerability was found in keylime. This security issue happens in some circumstances, due to some improperly handled exceptions, there exists the possibility that a rogue agent could create errors on the verifier that stopped attestation attempts for that host leaving it in an attested state but not verifying that anymore.

A vulnerability in Keylime before 6.3.0 allows an attacker to craft a request to the agent that resets the U and V keys as if the agent were being re-added to a verifier. This could lead to a remote code execution.

A flaw was found in Keylime before 6.3.0. The logic in the Keylime agent for checking for a secure mount can be fooled by previously created unprivileged mounts allowing secrets to be leaked to other processes on the host.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, Revocation Notifier uses a fixed /tmp path for UNIX domain socket which can allow unprivileged users a method to prohibit keylime operations.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, current keylime installer installs the keylime.conf file, which can contain sensitive data, as world-readable.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, quote responses from the agent can contain possibly untrusted ZIP data which can lead to zip bombs.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, unsanitized UUIDs can be passed by a rogue agent and can lead to log spoofing on the verifier and registrar.

Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,

A flaw was found in keylime 5.8.1 and older. The issue in the Keylime agent and registrar code invalidates the cryptographic chain of trust from the Endorsement Key certificate to agent attestations.