Search Vulnerabilities

It's possible for a gRPC client communicating with a HTTP/2 proxy to poison the HPACK table between the proxy and the backend such that other clients see failed requests. It's also possible to use this vulnerability to leak other clients HTTP header keys, but not values. This occurs because the error status for a misencoded header is not cleared between header reads, resulting in subsequent (incrementally indexed) added headers in the first request being poisoned until cleared from the HPACK table. Please update to a fixed version of gRPC as soon as possible. This bug has been fixed in 1.58.3, 1.59.5, 1.60.2, 1.61.3, 1.62.3, 1.63.2, 1.64.3, 1.65.4.

The OpenTelemetry Collector offers a vendor-agnostic implementation on how to receive, process and export telemetry data. An unsafe decompression vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to crash the collector via excessive memory consumption. OTel Collector version 0.102.1 fixes this issue. It is also fixed in the confighttp module version 0.102.0 and configgrpc module version 0.102.1.

The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.

Lack of error handling in the TCP server in Google's gRPC starting version 1.23 on posix-compatible platforms (ex. Linux) allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by initiating a significant number of connections with the server. Note that gRPC C++ Python, and Ruby are affected, but gRPC Java, and Go are NOT affected.

gRPC contains a vulnerability that allows hpack table accounting errors could lead to unwanted disconnects between clients and servers in exceptional cases/ Three vectors were found that allow the following DOS attacks: - Unbounded memory buffering in the HPACK parser - Unbounded CPU consumption in the HPACK parser The unbounded CPU consumption is down to a copy that occurred per-input-block in the parser, and because that could be unbounded due to the memory copy bug we end up with an O(n^2) parsing loop, with n selected by the client. The unbounded memory buffering bugs: - The header size limit check was behind the string reading code, so we needed to first buffer up to a 4 gigabyte string before rejecting it as longer than 8 or 16kb. - HPACK varints have an encoding quirk whereby an infinite number of 0’s can be added at the start of an integer. gRPC’s hpack parser needed to read all of them before concluding a parse. - gRPC’s metadata overflow check was performed per frame, so that the following sequence of frames could cause infinite buffering: HEADERS: containing a: 1 CONTINUATION: containing a: 2 CONTINUATION: containing a: 3 etc…

When gRPC HTTP2 stack raised a header size exceeded error, it skipped parsing the rest of the HPACK frame. This caused any HPACK table mutations to also be skipped, resulting in a desynchronization of HPACK tables between sender and receiver. If leveraged, say, between a proxy and a backend, this could lead to requests from the proxy being interpreted as containing headers from different proxy clients - leading to an information leak that can be used for privilege escalation or data exfiltration. We recommend upgrading beyond the commit contained in  https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/33005 https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/33005

There exists an vulnerability causing an abort() to be called in gRPC.  The following headers cause gRPC's C++ implementation to abort() when called via http2: te: x (x != trailers) :scheme: x (x != http, https) grpclb_client_stats: x (x == anything) On top of sending one of those headers, a later header must be sent that gets the total header size past 8KB. We recommend upgrading past git commit 2485fa94bd8a723e5c977d55a3ce10b301b437f8 or v1.53 and above.

gRPC contains a vulnerability whereby a client can cause a termination of connection between a HTTP2 proxy and a gRPC server: a base64 encoding error for `-bin` suffixed headers will result in a disconnection by the gRPC server, but is typically allowed by HTTP2 proxies. We recommend upgrading beyond the commit in  https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/32309 https://www.google.com/url

grpc-swift is the Swift language implementation of gRPC, a remote procedure call (RPC) framework. Prior to version 1.7.2, a grpc-swift server is vulnerable to a denial of service attack via a reachable assertion. This is due to incorrect logic when handling GOAWAY frames. The attack is low-effort: it takes very little resources to construct and send the required sequence of frames. The impact on availability is high as the server will crash, dropping all in flight connections and requests. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2. There are currently no known workarounds.

LengthPrefixedMessageReader in gRPC Swift 1.1.0 and earlier allocates buffers of arbitrary length, which allows remote attackers to cause uncontrolled resource consumption and deny service.

HTTP2ToRawGRPCServerCodec in gRPC Swift 1.1.1 and earlier allows remote attackers to deny service via the delivery of many small messages within a single HTTP/2 frame, leading to Uncontrolled Recursion and stack consumption.

Mismanaged state in GRPCWebToHTTP2ServerCodec.swift in gRPC Swift 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 allows remote attackers to deny service by sending malformed requests.

The package grpc before 1.24.4; the package @grpc/grpc-js before 1.1.8 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via loadPackageDefinition.